

~~Early Self-Government in Social Relations :~~
~~An Appendix to Chapter I of 'English Sanitary Institutions'~~

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~~EARLY SOCIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT~~

WHILE the Human Race in successive remote ages had been learning its early lessons of ~~Self~~-Preservation against the physical influences which it could recognise as destructive and morbid in common surrounding Nature, that class of influences had not been the only one in relation to which Human Life had had to struggle. Not less real than the relations of the race to surrounding things had been, within the race itself, relations which may be distinguished as Ethical; the relations in which each man had stood to his own self-government, and to the fortunes of other men; and in these relations, not less truly than in respect of physical surroundings, struggle against hostile influences had been a familiar experience of human life as long as human experience had been commemorated.

Definite thoughts regarding this portion of the human struggle for existence become possible to us only in proportion as the times to which our thoughts refer are times more or less historical; times, that is to say, from which the observations and recollections of man as to contemporary matters of fact have in some form or other been transmitted to us; and where no such historical basis for thought is given, compensation for its absence cannot be supplied by abstract theories of the constitution and movements of the human mind. The line of thought, indeed, is peculiarly one in which mere speculation cannot make way. We have no independent means of setting before ourselves an embryological view of early human ethics; we cannot, except from experience, bring into view a primeval ether of man's self-consciousness developing its faint first lines of vibration and ripple where reason will afterwards come to regulate conduct; cannot exhibit by what subtle nucleolating process conceptions of justice and prudence and duty, and standards of personal and social merit, first tended to take definite form in the mind of our race, and to become the lights and the fates of man's advancing career. The psychologist of to-day, who from his own particular basis would peer into the darkness of pre-traditionary times, hoping to see there some image of the mind which was in his earliest ancestors, soon discovers that the would-be telescope of his endeavour is in effect but an opaque mirror, and that the only image it can bring before his view is prac-

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also be ideal, it is thereby teaching us a lesson which we may do well to profit by.

From all this it seems evident that the best results in art and literature are to be achieved by those whose standard of the real and whose aspiration after the ideal are the highest; and though the limits, as well as the possibilities, in the matter of execution are different and various, the instinct of true genius will assuredly lead it right in the choice of the ways and means whereby to proceed. Undoubtedly the man who has become most famous in old days, and who will be most likely to live by fame in the time to come, is he who, in the first place, conceives the highest possible ideal, and, in the second, is able to represent it in the truest and most perfect manner.

And for ourselves. If we grub down on the floor of realism with no ideals to set like heavens in the sky above us, we are doomed to receive what we deserve—the bespattering of the mire and the dirt. Or if, on the other hand, we live in a world of mere dreams and fancies, and do not keep touch with the realities of life which are thronging round us, we fail to satisfy the natural cravings for what is tangible and comprehensible.

So we come back to where we began. To be real and true is the first great quality, but to conceive and superadd the highest possible ideal is also indispensable if we would ever hope to reach that perfection which in this world is, indeed, unknown, but which, in a world to come, may yet be found attainable.

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tically but a reflection of himself. In the imagination which he strives to exercise, he no doubt can conceive a mind differently endowed from his own in mere degree or proportion of the faculties he himself possesses; but faculties essentially other than those known to him as parts of his own self-consciousness he is absolutely unable to conceive. The only primeval being he can figure to himself as answering to the name of MAN is one whose Mental Mechanics (if the phrase may be allowed) would essentially have been the same with his own; a being, who would have categorised, as he himself now categorises, in forms predetermined for him by Nature; one, whose grammar of thought would have had for its nouns and verbs essentially the same cases and moods and tenses as are current in the rational language of to-day; one, who would have had the same aptitude as he himself now has for thinking *ought* or *ought not*, *is* or *is not*, *can* or *cannot*, *will* or *will not*; one, whose every voluntary action would have corresponded to some consciousness of motive or intention, and whose motives and intentions, however limited as to their objects, would in their kinds have corresponded to the motives and intentions which at present determine human conduct. Such (more or less) is the only type under which present man can definitely think to himself of the mind of previous man; it is one which no doubt he can in theory project to an infinitely remote distance in pre-historic time, and can set in motion there as his own will shall direct; but the *Protanthropos* which he thus creates and animates from within himself is no more than the reflexion of his own human mind.

Regarding the ethical relations of man in times which kept no written or other tangible record of the acts of contemporary life, information can to some extent be derived from the recitals which various early writers afterwards gave of such oral traditions as had reached them from their predecessors; traditions which, when they related to the comparatively near past, would often have been fairly valid as statements of fact, but which, when they related to any remote past, and more and more in proportion to the remoteness, would tend to be exaggerative and generally mythical. Traditions as above, which after longer or shorter periods of oral currency obtained permanent record in the opening chapters of those written histories and illustrations which the earliest writers afford with regard to human conduct in their own times, constitute the only direct evidence on which the ethics of early man can be judged by us; and it may be doubted whether even the oldest portions of this evidence reach back proportionately far in the past duration of mankind on the earth. The record, thus necessarily imperfect and often ambiguous, is not of such sort that indirect evidence is likely to make large positive additions to it; but undoubtedly there are comparisons and analogies which may somewhat assist us to appreciate its facts. Generally, the

archæology of the life of mankind is but a section of the Natural History of the Animal Kingdom, with sidelights thrown on it from other sections of that great province of study ; but also it has outlines specially human which require to be collated with subsequent and present human experience, while in parts it peculiarly claims for context the knowledge which travel during the last four centuries has acquired of populations in infant stages of ethical development ; and with interpretation assisted from such collateral sources as those, the very limited evidences of positive history and tradition can be constructed into a fairly consistent notion of the ethics of man during the later times to which the evidences relate.

In the ethical scheme by which Nature provides for the self-preservation of living races, it appears to be an essential, and is perhaps logically the first condition, that each individual of the race shall, within its appointed limits of space and time, struggle individually as it best can to continue and benefit its own separate life, and shall be free in last resort to sacrifice the lives of others to its own. The Free-will which Nature under that condition allows to individual egotism appears to be subject to no other limit or control than that which individual conscience (when conscience comes into work) will impose ; the possibility of its being exercised against the interest of the race does not appear logically excluded from the scheme ; but the condition which assigns it an essential place in the ethics of Nature is obviously not to be understood as more than one part in a system. Side by side with the selfish condition, that individual egotism shall be a chief security for the life-interests of the race, is the not less essential altruistic condition, that each living generation of the race shall breed succession to itself, and shall minister to the early needs of its progeny ; while also, in wide extent, Nature imposes the general altruistic condition that individuals of a race must be helpful to each other in the struggle which they severally wage for survival. The importance of the last-named condition is very great, as qualifying what might otherwise seem to be the absoluteness of individual egotism in the system of Nature. When the two conditions are considered together, we see that *Egotism* and *Altruism*, exercised in due mutual control, and each of them with regard duly proportioned between immediate and ulterior interests, are to be the two equally indispensable joint-factors of progress, and that every primâ-voce discord between them must sooner or later find its solution either in silence or in harmony.

While man has constituted no exception to the general experience of living Nature, that they who would live must struggle, he has strikingly exemplified the further experience (which various recent writers have brought into important relief) that, in the struggle of different races for survival, the success of any given race greatly depends on the degree in which the individuals of the race combine

for their struggle, and are helpful in it each to the other.¹ That each living thing tends first of all to struggle for its own life and satisfaction may be assumed as fundamental law; but Nature teems with illustrations of the widespread second tendency—the tendency to exertions of individual effort for objects which are larger than those of the individual; and in the best-studied parts of the animal kingdom, the cases where individuals of a species accept ties of common duty, the frequent instances of kindness from individual to individual, and above all the care of parents for their offspring, are facts almost as well known as the readiness of individuals to combat for themselves. The conjunction of those two tendencies is a leading fact in the psychical constitution of man, and has been all-powerful in determining his development. ~~Eminently it is true for mankind that Egotism and Altruism, exercised in due mutual control, and each of them with regard duly proportioned between immediate and ulterior objects, are the two equally indispensable joint-factors of progress; and that every prima-vocce discord between them has sooner or later to find its solution either in silence or in harmony.~~

For human life, it is the function of what we term *Morality* to deliberate and determine how the two impulses may work with most concurrence for the common good, and may waste themselves least against each other; and social institutions, developed in vast variety during successive ages of time, and under different conditions of stock and circumstance, have been the steps and forms of our slow experimental training in that great study.

- The aggregations of mankind which receive earliest mention in history may be deemed to have been essentially consanguineous; that is to say, they were tribes which respectively declared themselves to be of descent from single domestic stocks, and were such as might have grown up (with or without exogamic admixture) in proportion as any ancestral family circle, procreating new procreators, had enabled special kinship to express itself in successively larger and larger spheres of connexion. Of like effect with what thus appeared regarding the aggregations which first became historical, have been the teachings of modern ethnology regarding innumerable aggregations unknown to ancient history; for in proportion as explorers in comparatively late times have gathered exact knowledge of the lives and traditions of those multitudes of mankind which had been outside the main areas of advancing civilisation, it has become

* ¹ The doctrine that 'mutual aid is as much a law of Nature as mutual struggle' was set forth for English readers, with learning and vigorous thought, in a most interesting series of articles by Prince Kropotkin, in successive numbers of this Review from 1890 to 1892. He quotes *La lutte pour l'existence, et l'association pour la lutte* as the title of a lecture in which M. Lanessan, in 1882, taught to the effect of his title; and he cites various earlier like teachings, as particularly those of M. Espinasse in his *Sociétés Animales*, 1877, and those of M. Kessler in an Address to the Society of Russian Naturalists, St. Petersburg, 1880.

evident that among them, as among the previously historical parts of mankind, the essence of each existing aggregation has been the cohesion of kinsfolk as tribe; the tribe having for its declared or implied principle of identity that it is conscious of one common descent, distinguishing it more or less from other multitudes. This, of course, is not tantamount to saying, what evidently would be too much to affirm, that each tribuary aggregation arose from 'family' and 'domestic life' in the sense which the latter terms now bear. Question is not here raised with regard to the early marriage-customs of mankind; no question whether, at specified times, the sexual relations of our ancestors were of the stable and 'sole-proprietary' type which Milton paints to have been 'in Paradise, where all things common else,'¹ or whether, on the contrary, they were more or less shifting and promiscuous. No other point is here in view than the physiological point of heredity. Whether at a given early time the bi-sexual human home with offspring was of simple or of confused constitution, equally in either case it was a nucleus with defined possibilities of evolution, and would furnish growth after its type. Within that nucleus, more or less, as in Milton's imagining, 'relations dear, and all the charities of father, son, and brother, first were known'; in heritage from it, all which had been instinctive in those relations would continue to work in the same sense in the enlarging tribuary sphere; and so long as the sphere remained unbroken, there would be diffused in it a spirit of family-tie and a tradition of family-custom binding together the aggregated units. Thus, in the remote antiquity when thoughts of duty first began to shape themselves in the human mind, distinction of the world into *Tribe* and *Not-tribe* would have been among the tribuary casuist's first principles; till, in time, as the original tribe broke into parts with more or less impulse to dissociation, each of such parts, now becoming an individual whole, would have inherited (so to speak against the world at large) a distinct tribuary conscience for itself; wherewith, and with further time and separation, it would rapidly grow into strangeness towards all others, including, sooner or later, even those who originally had been of its nearest kin.

It cannot be supposed that the human race, distributed into tribes, would be as a homogeneous field for common exercise of human influences and motives, or that those influences and motives, with the balance between them, should be as one harmonious impulse for the whole. Egotism and Altruism, omnipresent as joint-factors in the moral constitution of all human beings, and everywhere under appeals to operate according to circumstances in the struggle for existence, would soon find wide apparent differences between tribuary and extra-tribuary interests, and would be apt to proportion themselves to the cases accordingly. They who would

† / , / 1 *Paradise Lost*, iv, ll. 751-752.

proceed to read what history has to say on the differentiation of effect produced under that difference of circumstances may advantageously first pause to consider with attention the pathology of the moral factors, and the (so to speak) fated meaning of any failure of balance between them. Especially it is of interest to reflect as from beforehand, though with the additional light which all human history affords, on the significance which attaches to the egotistic factor if in unbalanced intemperate operation. Of enormous meaning in the history, both of tribes and of individuals, have been the crude facts of unbalanced impatient egotism; of an egotism claiming to be free from exterior and ulterior limits, an egotism not content within such rules as are common to itself with others, an egotism which not only is without thoughts of altruistic duty, but often also disdains even the self of to-morrow as another than the self of to-day. This egotism—so passionate for its own expansion, so ravenous towards the narrow near, so ruthless towards all which is not immediate self, this has been the evil genius of our race's development; this, the aboriginal Cain, the familiar blood-stained figure which stalks conspicuous in the dawning of history.

As evidence tending to throw light on the moral characteristics of early man with reference to the life-interests of his kind, incomparably the most striking of all material is that which ancient history presents in its various narratives and descriptions of War. Of the creature Man it has been said with every possible emphasis (and there undoubtedly are senses in which the saying is true) that War is his state of nature.[†] History more or less authentic, regarding Assyrian, Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek and Roman civilisation, in ages perhaps from two to five thousand years ago, is a terrible record as to the quantity and quality of the wars which in those ages were habitual to leading branches of mankind already more or less emerged from savageness; and traditions which join on to that history, and are commonly read as its first pages, carry back the significance of its record to times which are incalculably more remote. Along all the line of retrospect, unmeasured mutual slaughter of human beings repeats itself as with the regularity of Nature. To the same effect is the testimony of those innumerable streamlets of myth and fable which descend from the pre-historic distance to join the current of true history; they ever bear the tell-tale colour of human blood. War,

[†] A mathematician, speculating on the mode in which given creatures would struggle for existence, might perhaps assume a mathematically equal diffusion of the struggle; so that every struggling unit concerned would be in impartial hostility to every other struggling unit; but history has shown nothing like this in the struggle of human beings for existence. The record never suggests as our 'state of war' the uniform and indiscriminate fighting of man with man throughout the community of the human race; it tells only of the conflict of opposed multitudes of men with organisation of each multitude for its hostile purpose, and introduces to us each such organised multitude only as a consanguineous tribe.

mercilessly cruel and destructive war, between populations within reach of each other, is the common ancestral tale. Always and everywhere, whether the clue purports to reach back to the first aggregations of mankind, or dates only from the far subsequent times when nations have begun to take form, and have caused their reciprocal lusts of conquest to become main currents in history, equally, whichever way we look, the one dominant feature is War. In proportion as the periods are remote, the achievements are more stupendous, and the personages more heroic and imposing; till by degrees the individuality of man is lost in a myth-world which itself teaches the same lesson. Hybrids and giants and titans are the nebular looming of early human strugglers for victory; and war is the pastime of immortal gods. From the only heaven which the conceiving power of early man was able to construct, anthropomorphic gods were ever ready to rush down for participation in the battles of men; and that legendary heaven, torn by wars and hatreds of its own, reflected as a contemporary mirror the pre-historic savage discords of earth.

It, of course, is not possible to set forth in actual numbers the quantities of mutual slaughter and ruin which the constant warfare between early aggregations of mankind involved; but that the quantities, proportionately considered, must very often have been more than enough to make periods of long arrest in social development may be assumed as certain; and instances in which particular aggregations were almost or quite exterminated must certainly not have been infrequent. With what destructiveness of intention the wars of ancient barbarous races were waged is in part matter of actual history; while in other part it may be sufficiently inferred from the nature of the case, with such aids to inference as have been furnished in comparatively late times, in proportion as the exploration of countries previously unknown has brought to light the continuing mutual cruelties of savage populations. The ordinary incidents of warfare—the hot-blood mutual slaughter of combatants, with destruction of homes and harvests of the conquered, and with the deadly destitution to be endured by fugitives, would be at their worst in savage war; and then, in sequel of success, and in furtherance of the exterminative intention, would come the massacre of prisoners, commonly with studied tortures, and amid rites of religious sacrifice to the gods who had given victory; the only exception being, that prisoners whom it might be found desirable to keep alive for concubinage or other servile use would be exempted from massacre, but if males would be subjected to mutilation. When wars had become large, the captives for slaughter might be hundreds or thousands at a time, and it is certain that, even down to comparatively late times, the victors in celebrating their success would generally, on a proportionate scale, crown their triumph with feasts of cannibalism.

Yet, while it is virtually certain that the state of nature of man

included a perpetual state of war as above described, and that enormous pressure was thus exercised against the survival of the race by the murderousness which so largely expressed in collective action the dominant egotism of man's nature, no reason exists for supposing that, even in the remotest and most savage period of man's development, individual egotism operated at large as a sole power. In generalising just now on the moral influences which are giving to the human race its continuity of life and development, we saw that egotism and altruism in proper exercise are the two equally indispensable joint-factors of progress; and so far back as the figure of man can be discerned in the field of history, always he can be distinctly recognised as acting under that compound influence. Thus, even in respect of the records here under review, as to the universality of war among the early inhabitants of the earth, we find that, in every spectacle of war exhibited to us, the concords as well as the discords of men are brought to light; the tribuary concords, namely, which have organised multitudes of men into single wholes for the respective common purposes of aggression and defence. Concords, however, for purposes of war were but a part of the common spirit of tribuary life; and, inasmuch as the tribuary spirit included and expressed all which was highest in pre-historic man, the significance of that spirit in its most general sense deserves extremely careful consideration. It needs hardly be noted that, over such parts of the earth's surface as were known to ancient history, the tribes then historical have now long since, under the conquests of war or otherwise, passed indistinguishably out of sight into the miscellaneous composition of modern nations; but explorations of other regions during the last four centuries, and especially within the last hundred and fifty years, have brought to light in their stead innumerable previously unknown tribes still existing in virgin savageness, with immemorial traditions of common descent and common custom; and study of these new-found tribes is not less instructive than that of ancient history, to illustrate what have been the universal governing principles in tribuary aggregations of mankind.

The point which clearly must stand first in any such consideration has already been indicated in an early passage of the present paper—the point, namely, that ‘tribe’ in its historical sense is but the enlarged equivalent of ‘family,’ and that the sentiment of special family-tie, binding together the units of the tribe in submission as it were to one household-law, and individualising the tribe as against other tribes in the struggle for means of subsistence, was the main determining influence for the sympathies and antipathies of early man, and for the particular channels and forms in which his egotism and his altruism respectively tended to express themselves. This, which ancient history told of such early savage tribes as had become known to it, has been generalised without limit by analogous knowledge accumulated since then, in proportion as new explorations

of the earth's surface have brought under ethnographical study the customs and traditions of previously unknown tribes still subsisting in primæval savageness. Everywhere the characteristic of the tribuary spirit has been to potentiate and sanctify as against individual egotism the (so to speak) joint-stock egotism of the tribe. Its tendency has been so to merge each merely personal ipseity in the collective self, that the man has had no apartness from his tribe; that within the tribe, struggle between man and man, except as by accident, has had no place; and that mutual help has been the general law. Thus, while inter-tribuary wars, expressing the respective tribuary egotisms and hatreds, were causing enormous waste of human life, probably there may have reigned within the limits of each separate tribe as perfect a peace as the world has ever known. It of course is not to be supposed that under tribuary law or custom the rights and immunities of individual life were the same as those which modern society concedes; for though, no doubt, the tribuary law or custom would have purported (like modern police-law) to safeguard individual life against inflictions of individual wrong, the individual life in the tribe would have been but an item of tribe-property, for the tribe at any time to expend as it judged best for the good of the tribe; and it is among the best known facts in history that, under the application of this system, very large quantities of human life were habitually sacrificed to the tribuary theories of common good. The demands which were of all the most peremptory, and which have always stood first in ethnological interest, were those for sacrifices to the gods in every chief case of tribuary hope or fear. Different under different skies may have been the savage classification and naming of those unseen powers, and different the rituals which did them honour; but human hopes and fears related everywhere essentially to the same objects: to seasons and weather and harvests, to floods and tornados and earthquakes, to blights and famines and pestilences, to the energies of the living body with its passion of sex for sex, to the marvel of its self-continuance by offspring, and finally to the darkness which lies beyond death. The powers who awarded good or evil within that universe of human hopes and fears, and who would at every moment be the arbiters of fortune in whatever warlike or other enterprise the tribe undertook, were un pitying gods whom only sacrifice of human life could conciliate. The sacrifice, too (at least according to its original intention), must be the very best which the tribe, or its sacrificing family, had to offer; not some mere war-captive or comparatively unprized life, but the first-born of the sacrificing family, or the elect of the youth of the tribe; and the sacrificial victim's passage to death was as fulfilment of highest privilege and pride. To the tribuary mind there would not have occurred any sense of special

* See the series of papers, by Prince Kropotkin, mentioned in the first footnote above; especially the paper, April 1891, entitled 'Mutual Aid among Savages.'

pathos in such scenes of sacrifice, nor any kind of protest against the ruthless gods whose priests dictated them; the leading thought would probably have been that the life was given with gladness for the good of the tribe to which it had been due; but more pitiful in these after-times of ours are the thoughts of those who read (for instance) the tale of Jephthah's burnt offering, or are thrilled by the immortal words in which Lucretius denounces the death of Iphigenia at Aulis. The quantities of human life which the early tribes of mankind expended from within themselves in expiatory and propitiatory sacrifices as above (to be distinguished, of course, from the triumphal sacrifices in which none but captives taken in war were immolated) were not such as we can now estimate with any approach to numerical precision. That compared with losses endured in war they were almost as nothing, and that in quantitative proportion to the total bulk of a tribe they would in general have had no great significance, may be taken as probably the truth; but that the actual numbers were always insignificant is not what history seems to tell. It, on the contrary, seems certain that at least in some cases, under particular uses of particular superstitions, the sacrificial consumption of human life would in mere numbers be of interest to the community; as, for instance, that wherever the Phœnician system of child-sacrifice had become current, there could be few families not bearing the scar which ablation of a first-born child leaves behind it.

Of equal stringency with the demands which the tribe made for human life as homage to the gods, and of amount probably in general very much larger, were the exactions which represented economical intention. In early ages of mankind a rising tribe could hardly have tradition of any more familiar fear than that of deficient food-winning in proportion to numbers; and probably no principle of tribe-life could have been deemed more imperative than that the tribe must not suffer through having bellies to fill, where service in food-winning could not be rendered in return. The struggling tribe must agree upon rough-and-ready ways of keeping down its number of mouths to such as the efficiency of its food-winning could well satisfy. Lives domestically unprofitable or burdensome must not be let run on. They whom age or disease was rendering useless and dependent must part with life by their own act or by the act of others, and would often be gratified with the consciousness that in death they became food to their kinsfolk. Infants deemed superfluous for continuation of the tribe must be killed or cast aside; especially in large proportion infants of the female sex, and always such infants as showed sickliness or deformity. Of the same ethical and economical meaning with infanticide in relation to the history of mankind, and probably more or less in association with it from the earliest known times, were various other endeavours to loosen the bond which Nature had instituted between the sexual and the

parental instincts, and to set free the sexual appetite for indulgence without care of provision for offspring: endeavours which consisted sometimes in the employment of drugs to prevent conception, or of contrivances after the type of that with which Jacob's grandson (Onan) 'displeased the Lord,' or sometimes in the use of medicaments or mechanical means to procure abortion of the uterine fruit.

With regard to the fact that early tribe-life took upon itself to restrict by means which it judged appropriate the numbers of those whom the tribe should be required to feed, it has to be recognised that a tribe, waging difficult struggle for means of subsistence, would certainly find its difficulties lessened in proportion as it undertook only to feed such strong and effective members as would bring home more food than they consumed. In extreme difficulties of struggle, the question whether ineffective lives should be admitted to privilege of food might practically be question whether effective lives should starve; and thus the tribe, for its own preservation, might in last resort be summoned by Nature to apply the extreme rule of eliminating all life which could not support itself. The tribe however, which thus exercised prerogatives of life and death could not exempt itself from the common conditions of morality, but must at least by degrees learn standards of right and wrong for its estimate of difficulties and its application of expedients; and to adjudicate between life and life, between expedient and expedient would soon lead human thought into the depth of morals. When tribes or families had begun to consider under what pressure of exterior circumstances they would be ready to leave their weaker kinsfolk to starve, or would abandon first dictates of Nature in the relations of sex to sex, and of sexes to progeny, the moral questions before them were essentially of like kind with the questions which engage modern thought; and it may safely be assumed that, as soon as such questions arose, lines of cleavage, such as are now familiar to us, began forthwith to reveal wide distinctions in the moral structure of mankind. In contrast with the rude egotism which accepts at any cost to others the expedients it finds of service to its own appetites, natures of nobler type would practise and proclaim the altruism which identifies the welfare of others with its own; instincts of individual affection would plead in tribuary councils against the ruthless putting away of old and young; and tribes of improving quality would more and more think it shameful to draw strength from the life-blood of the weak, or to thrive by cruel and obscene practices against Nature. Slowly, too, but surely, would come the time when considerations like the above must apply themselves to the relations of tribe with tribe; and for reasonable tribes a future could be foretold when many peoples would have as it were but one conscience, and would cease from inflicting cruelties on each other.